

# The Migration of Serbs and Albanians within and between Inner Serbia and Kosovo c. 1930-1981

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## Introduction<sup>1</sup>

The migrations of ethnic groups in any region are typically a contentious issue, fraught with implications for the maintenance, dissolution, and creation of political entities and for their internal and international relations. Seldom has this observation more force than in the Balkans, and arguably nowhere within them more than in Serbia and its included autonomous province, Kosovo.

Indeed, even the selection of names for regions and groups engenders debate. In this paper we use the terms (or their English glosses) given to us in the sources, all of which are the official publications of Serbian (or Yugoslav) statistical bureaus and thus in standard Belgrade Serbian: Serbs for *Srbi*, Albanians for *Albanci*, UZAS for *Uza Srbija* (Inner Serbia, not including the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina), and KiM for *Kosovo i Metohija* (Kosovo and Metohija).<sup>2</sup> Our interest is to deepen, expand, and test an earlier analysis by Petrovic and Blagojevic (1989; 1992) on the migration of Serbs and Montenegrins out of Kosovo. That analysis focused primarily on interviews with a nonrandom sample of 500 Serb families that had left KiM for UZAS, although it used ancillary demographic data in support.

Our approach, using Yugoslav census statistics, is in principle also expandable to include the migration of other ethnic groups within and between UZAS and KiM or between any of the constituent regions of the former Yugoslavia. In this paper we focus on KiM, UZAS as a whole, and the border counties of UZAS fronting on KiM and running from the UZAS-Montenegrin border on the northwest to the UZAS-Macedonian border on the southeast. Thus we examine the migrational behavior of:

1. Serbs in UZAS
2. Serbs in the border counties
3. Albanians in KiM
4. Serbs in KiM
5. Albanians in UZAS
6. Albanians in the border counties

It is important to note that Serbs are in the majority in 1 and 2, while Albanians are in the majority in 3. Conversely, Serbs are in the minority in 4, and Albanians are in the minority in 5 and 6.

Petrovic and Blagojevic's analysis tells a story supported by accounts told by Serbs to both of the present authors as to many other observers, of the intimidation and terrorization of Kosovo Serbs by increasingly militant Albanian separatists and of eventual Serbian flight. In this paper we ask whether that story, now of mythic proportions and stretching back six centuries, can be supported by deeper analysis of the demographic data.<sup>3</sup> Our findings will be that:

1. Initial technical analysis casts serious doubt on the accepted mythology of flight and on the Petrovic-Blagojevic analysis.
2. Inclusion of an hypothesis of heterogeneous exposure and susceptibility to intimidation, based on analysis of ancillary data, supports them.

We conclude that the results of Petrovic and Blagojevic's analysis may be correct, even if only in part. We can support it with important qualifications. Both it and our own analysis could be greatly refined if more specific demographic data were made available.

### Measuring or Estimating Migration

Information on migration is difficult to obtain. Differences between populations at points in time cannot be taken, as is often done, only as the result of migration. The fundamental “balancing equation” of demographic analysis states that the difference between the size of a population at two points in time is attributable to the number of births, minus the number of deaths, plus net migration.

$$P_{t+n} = P_t + \sum_t^{t+n} B - \sum_t^{t+n} D + \sum_t^{t+n} M$$

where  $P_t$  and  $P_{t+n}$  are the population totals at times  $t$  and  $t+n$ , and  $B$ ,  $D$ , and  $M$  are the totals of births, deaths, and net migration over the span of time,  $t$  to  $t+n$ .

To use the equation to estimate net migration, we must have information on numbers of births and deaths between and on the observed size of the population at the two points in time. The difference between the size of the population at the end of the period and that calculated from its size at the beginning, plus births, minus deaths, must be attributable to net migration. This is the approach taken by Petrovic and Blagojevic (*op. cit.*). But even this estimation would not give us information on *directional* migrational flows in and out of an area, only on their net difference. Information on the direction of migration is at the core of any understanding of population dynamics in KiM and UZAS. Further (and as we will see, an impediment to any analysis), even though we know the ethnic composition of the population of different regions at points in time, we do not yet have sufficient *ethno-specific* information on births and deaths or birth and death rates *within regions*, but only for regions as a whole.<sup>4</sup> Thus, a precise application of the balancing equation even for ethnospecific net migration is currently impossible.

The census of Yugoslavia for 1981, however, contains a remarkable table (Table 056), showing the results of migrational flows originating at several points in time, across the regions of Yugoslavia, by ethnic group. In general, respondents were asked in 1981 whether they had migrated to their current place of permanent residence, if so when, and from where. Their responses were cross-tabulated by their declared ethnicity. The time periods are in rough blocks (before 1940, which we arbitrarily decide to be 1931-40, then 1941-45, 1946-60, 1961-70, 1971-75, 1976-81). The origin points are specified as “another place in the same community” (*opština*), or “another community” and if another community, in which other republic or autonomous region it was located.<sup>5</sup> These data allow us to classify migrants as having moved within the same community, between communities in the same republic or autonomous region, or between republics or autonomous regions, at different points in time, and by ethnicity. Other tables in the 1981 and other Yugoslav censuses give information on place of permanent residence by place of birth, but not by time of removal to the place of permanent residence, nor by ethnicity.<sup>6</sup>

### Using the Migrational Data

Using the data from Table 056 is problematic. Some difficulties are obvious. Censuses are not perfectly accurate. Statistical offices may manipulate data to achieve political goals or may be simply incompetent. The reporting of ethnicity is subject both to definitional problems and to the way in which questions of ethnic identification are put and to the way in which individuals respond.

The Yugoslav censuses appear to have been done to the highest international standards by a coercive government and a very competent statistical office. Execution of the censuses appears to be as good as can be expected anywhere. While political manipulation is always possible, the results of the census of 1981 appear to be sufficiently consistent to make simple manipulation unlikely, and in respect of KiM, 1981 falls before the most acute manifestations of ethnic tension and before the independence of the Serbian statistical apparatus from overall Communist Party and Federal control.<sup>7</sup>

Ethnicity was reported in over 20 standard categories in 1981.<sup>8</sup> Respondents had the option to respond with their self-perceived ethnicity, or to declare their ethnicity in terms of where they lived (e.g., “I am a Serb because I live in Serbia”), or to decline to state. In all of the censuses, some reports of ethnicity are problematic, especially for comparisons over time. It is said that some Albanian Muslims have sometimes

claimed Turkish ethnicity in order to qualify for “repatriation” to Turkey (see later comments on population counts). “Muslim” appears as a category contrasted with others like “Serb”. However, it is of special relevance mostly in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Sandzak region of UZAS where Slavs might be either Muslim, Catholic (thus putatively Croat), or Orthodox (thus putatively Serb). In KiM and UZAS, in our view, respondents were more likely to report in terms of the locally salient categories of “Albanian” or “Serb”. Most Albanians were Muslim, but some were Catholic; most Serbs were at least nominally Orthodox. However, the “ethnic” category “Yugoslav” allowed respondents to opt out of the traditional classifications. This category was employed principally by Party members or committed Yugoslavists demonstrating their loyalty to the Yugoslav ideal, or by Muslims (principally in Bosnia-Herzegovina) not wishing to declare themselves as Muslim, since that category was often stigmatized. This category is rarely named in KiM and in UZAS is mostly an urban phenomenon. We therefore rest in this analysis with the simple categories, “Serb” and “Albanian”.<sup>9</sup>

Demographically, Table 056 presents other problems. One cannot simply compare the responses in it over time as directly indicative of migrational flows and particularly not of the propensity to migrate. It is that propensity, and especially changes in it under shifting social, political and economic circumstances, that are of interest.

The numbers of persons who in 1981 report a move from some origin at some date to the current place of residence have been diminished by two processes. First, some of the members of the same cohort making such a report will have died and are not included in the 1981 census. Second, some members of that cohort, although still alive, may have moved again before 1981 and are reported elsewhere in the table. Further, since the populations of the sending regions were changing over time, shifts in the numbers of migrants may reflect no more than changes in the base population at risk of migrating. Finally, the different reporting periods are of different length, so that shifts in the numbers of migrants may reflect only differences in the time available in which to migrate. In our view, it is the *rate* of migration that is the measure of interest, and estimation of that rate requires taking into account the size of the population at risk and the length of the reporting periods. The Serb story of flight is a story of changes in the propensity to migrate, as individuals were faced with intimidation. It is this quantity that we must seek to uncover – the rate of migration, per person at risk, per year.

### **Correcting for Mortality**

Petrovic and Blagojevic do not attempt to deal with these problems. We first attempt to correct for mortality effects. To do so, we should know the mortality schedules of Serb and Albanian populations in UZAS and in KiM, and the age and sex structure of those populations, over time. We do not have that detailed information. All we have is the crude death rates and the age and sex specific death rates for the two *regions*. While we can be confident that the rates for UZAS are predominantly driven by events occurring to Serbs, because the population of UZAS is almost entirely Serb, we cannot have that confidence for the rates for KiM, because although Albanians are in a majority there, the Serb proportion has been significant. Further, the Serb proportion in KiM has changed over time, from about 23 percent in 1948 to about 13 percent in 1981. The best we can do here is to assume that rates for KiM are characteristic of Albanian populations anywhere and that UZAS rates are characteristic of Serbs anywhere (that is, that death rates are more a function of ethnicity than of region). It is also less problematic to use the crude death rates than to attempt more refined analysis using age and sex specific rates, because that would also require ethnospecific age and sex information on population structure and deaths by region, which we do not have.<sup>10</sup>

We therefore take a simple approach, cognizant of the uncertainty introduced. For each *censal* period we find the crude death rates for UZAS and KiM, and we calculate the survival rate as 1-CDR. We smooth these rates annually across the intercensal periods by linear interpolation to obtain an estimated rate at the midpoint of each reported *migrational* period. (The reported migrational periods and the intercensal periods are not identical.) For each migrant population reporting (in 1981) migration from place X to place Y at time t, we survive that population backward from 1981 to the midpoint of the reported migrational period midpoint, one migrational period at a time at the appropriate survival rate for each, making the assumption that migrants originating from each period came on average at its midpoint. For Serbs, we use the UZAS rates, even if the individuals had moved to KiM, and for Albanians we use the KiM rates, even if the

individuals had moved to UZAS.<sup>11</sup> The original data in Table 056 we call “Survivors”, the reconstructed populations at time  $t$  we call “Survivors + Deaths.” The differences in the data from this reconstruction are modest, but important. They show, as one might expect, larger proportional differences for remote migration periods than for more recent ones.<sup>12</sup>

### Correcting for Subsequent Migration

The correction for mortality is simpler than that for subsequent migration because, while a migrant can only die once, he or she may move many times and in many patterns of movement. We have no migrational histories for both ethnic groups in both regions, but from general ethnographic information and personal experience we anticipate two important kinds of movement. The first is local movement (1) within the community into which a cohort settled or (2) between communities in the region into which a cohort settled. For example, some Serbs migrating from Kosovo to Inner Serbia in 1955 and surviving until 1981 may have moved (1) across the street or (2) to another suburb of a major city. In the census of 1981 these appear as migrants within and between communities of Inner Serbia, not as migrants from Kosovo. We do have some information on such movements, because Table 056 reports the migrations of people who made such intraregional moves. Because we have no knowledge of the duration of successive residences, we assume here that interregional migrants at some time,  $t$ , were subject to the risks of intraregional migration (as we estimate them from the data) from the time of their original interregional migration. To implement this idea, we simply use the risk of intraregional movement in each period as though it were a mortality rate, and the complement of that as though it were a survival rate. We thus divide the number of “Survivors + Dead” by the probability of not moving intraregionally in each period from the period of initial migration, forward to 1981. We call these people “Original Migrants”.

The second kind of migration is repeated interregional migration. In our experience, the movement of Serbs and Albanians to locations outside of Serbia is modest. For example, some persons migrating from Kosovo to Inner Serbia might have gone to work in Germany and then returned to Inner Serbia, where they would be classified as migrants from overseas. The same conditions apply to migrations to other republics, such as Slovenia, and return. We do not attempt to correct for this kind of subsequent migration. Similarly, some persons may have migrated from Kosovo to Inner Serbia and then back to Kosovo, and then perhaps even back to Inner Serbia again. They would appear in Table 056 according to their location of origin in the last move, reported in 1981. Such movements would not surprise us, especially for Albanians moving in the traditional temporary labor migration patterns (*pecalba*) between regions. But we have no good way to estimate these cyclical effects, and rest with our correction for subsequent local migration. In our view, this is the dominant correction to the reported data, beyond the mortality correction. Nevertheless, we caution that we may underestimate subsequent migration and thus insufficiently inflate the number of survivors.

### Estimating the Rate of Migration

As noted, even the raw number of original migrants is not fully meaningful, since different numbers of resident persons might have yielded the same number of original outmigrants. In the next step we divide the number of original migrants from place  $X$  to place  $Y$  in period  $P$  by the number of persons who might have migrated, i.e. the population at risk of migrating, namely those resident in  $X$  at the midpoint of  $P$ . (We make the common assumption, for convenience, that on average the migrants left at the midpoint of  $P$  and that the population at risk is the average of the populations at the beginning and at the end of  $P$ .) The result of this calculation is a probability of migrating, the “chance” that a person in  $X$  will migrate to  $Y$  during  $P$ .<sup>13</sup>

Since all reporting periods are not of the same length we then divide the result of the previous calculation by the length of  $P$  (in years). The result is an estimate of the annual migration *rate* per person per year. Our analysis concentrates on this migration rate, since it is the best measure of the propensity to migrate.<sup>14</sup>

Figures 1-4 show these successive corrections for:

1. Serb migration from KiM to UZAS
2. Albanian migration from KiM to UZAS
3. Serb migration from UZAS to KiM
4. Albanian migration from UZAS to KiM

In each figure the solid line represents survivors, the long-dashed line survivors plus the dead, the short-dashed line the original migrants as augmented for subsequent migration (all read on the left ordinate on a logarithmic scale), and the thick shaded line represents the rate of migration (read on the right ordinate on an arithmetic scale).

Figure 5 shows intraregional migration rates by ethnicity, and Figure 6 shows the interregional rates between UZAS and KiM. In both figures, Serb migration is indicated by diamonds, Albanian by squares. Migration within or to the “home territory” (UZAS for Serbs, Kosovo for Albanians)<sup>15</sup> is shown with a solid line, migration to the “other territory” is shown with a dashed line.

### Discussion

Figures 1-4 show how the count of survivors in 1981 is successively inflated by the corrections for mortality and subsequent migration. Because the raw numbers of migrants are vastly different across the two regions and two ethnic groups, we use a logarithmic scale to display them; that scale shows proportional differences. The mortality correction is greater for earlier than for later periods, both because migrants from earlier periods have had more time to die, and because mortality rates were higher in the past. By contrast (and as an artifact of how the correction was applied) the migrational correction is relatively constant across time.

There is a broad similarity in the raw counts and their corrections between all four of the figures. Levels of migration have tended to increase since the second world war, which was either a low point, or was close to the prewar levels. Migration then increases sharply to the mid-1950s, more slowly to the mid-1960s, stays flat or falls to the mid-1970s, then increases again.

These numerical counts may mislead, as noted, even if corrected for mortality and subsequent migration. We take into account the size of the populations at risk and the length of the reporting periods, and examine the migration rates. There are again similarities between the four figures. Migration to the homeland region (Figs. 1, 4) shows an accelerating increase up to the mid-1970s and then a decrease. The level of Serb migration to UZAS after about 1946 is about twice that of Albanian migration to KiM, and there is a drop in Albanian migration to KiM during World War II. There are fewer similarities between Figs. 2 and 3, migration to the non-homeland region. Both show a sharp drop, at about the same levels, for Serb and Albanian migration from the 1930s to World War II, and an increase thereafter. After 1956 Serb migration into KiM is flat out to 1976, then falls. Albanian migration to UZAS after 1956 continues to rise, although more slowly, flattens to 1976, then rises again.

Fig. 5 permits a different arrangement of the data, showing just the migration rates for intraregional movement, that is, the rates corresponding to the corrections for subsequent migration. Intraregional migration for Serbs and Albanians is higher in the homeland territory than in the other territory. It is usually lower for Serbs than for Albanians in the home territory but usually higher for Serbs than for Albanians in the “foreign” territory. All four traces show a sharp decline from the 1930s to World War II, then a fairly steady increase to 1976, then a drop. These data suggest that people move locally more in the region in which they are already dominant but that Albanians are more mobile locally in KiM than Serbs are in UZAS. Conversely, Serbs are more mobile locally in KiM than Albanians are in UZAS.

We may speculate on the meaning of these patterns. First, the changes in migration rate seem to reflect changes in social and economic circumstances, with rates falling during World War II, then increasing as economic reconstruction and especially industrialization and rural-urban migration increased.<sup>16</sup> The fall in rates after the mid-1970s for all four streams suggests a slowing of economic growth that affected all groups in all regions.

Fig. 6 then shows, on the same scale, interregional migration rates in the same way. Interregional migration is generally a fourth of intraregional migration. Unlike intraregional, it is higher for movement to the “foreign” region than to the “homeland” region. The rate of Albanian migration to UZAS is greater than that of Serbs to KiM, but the rate of Serb migration to UZAS is greater than that of Albanians to KiM. All of these rates show a decline after the 1970s except that of Albanians moving from KiM to UZAS.

How may we interpret these patterns? First, migration over longer distances is less frequent, suggesting that the costs of migration are relatively high. The increase in interregional migration, as for intraregional, suggests economic expansion and rural-urban migration into industrializing areas. Movement into the “foreign” region is quite flat from the 1950s to the 1970s. This suggests that there was little going on in KiM to attract Serbs after the recovery from World War II (when Serbs were eventually permitted by the Tito regime to return). It also suggests that there was no acceleration in job prospects for Albanians moving to UZAS in that period. The upturn in Albanian migration to UZAS in the terminal period is puzzling. Rapid population increase in the Albanian population of KiM may have constituted a push factor, but we have no evidence as yet of a pull from job growth (especially in the construction industry, in which Albanians are heavily employed in UZAS). If we are to believe the story of ethnic conflict and flight of Serbs from KiM, why would Albanians increase their rate of departure from KiM when they were coming into ascendancy there? Both groups show a continuing increase in return to the homeland region until the 1970s, then a downturn; this downturn is puzzling. Why, as ethnic tensions were rising in KiM, would Serbs leave it at a lower rate? Why would Albanians in UZAS, as their political star was rising in KiM, return to KiM at a lower rate? Factors of economic contraction and overpopulation of Albanians in KiM would seem more plausible explanations.

The evidence presented thus far casts doubt on arguments by Petrovic and Blagojevic that economic factors were unimportant in explaining migrational flows, and that Albanian intimidation of Serbs drove the latter out of KiM at an increasing rate. We can extend some credence to that story if we imagine that the Serbs in KiM were heterogeneous in respect of their exposure and susceptibility to intimidation. If they were, and if the more exposed and susceptible left early (let us say between the 1960s and 1970s), those who remained would have been less exposed and susceptible. For example, the Serbs who left early might have lived in areas in which Albanians were dominant, while those who were left might have lived in areas in which Serbs were, if not dominant, at least more numerous (such as the northern parts of KiM around Kosovska Mitrovica). Given some constant level of intimidation, the rate of outmigration of the surviving and more resistant Serbs would fall.

Indeed, the censuses contain other tables that give ethnic composition by sub-area within KiM from 1961 through 1981. In 1961 Serbs and their co-religionist Montenegrins constituted 29 percent of the population of KiM, in 1971 24 percent but in 1981 only 15 percent. In 1961, 21 percent of Serbs and Montenegrins lived in communities in which their proportion in that community was below the KiM mean, while in 1971 and 1981 the percentage dropped to 18 and then to 17. This suggests that Serbs were leaving communities in which they were less represented to begin with. Looking just at the 22 communities consistently reported both in 1971 and 1981 we see that the proportion of Serbs and Montenegrins present in each in 1971 is negatively correlated with the change in that proportion 1971-81.<sup>17</sup> Figure 9 shows that the relationship between the proportion in 1971 and the proportional change 1971-81 is logarithmic, with a correlation coefficient of 0.73, accounting for 53 percent of the variance in the proportional change.<sup>18</sup> Thus, this ancillary evidence strongly suggests that Serbs were leaving communities in which they were in the smallest proportion to begin with, and in which one might surmise they were most vulnerable. We have no direct evidence on their destinations or indeed on whether their diminution was the result of migration, but the decrease in migration rate for Serbs moving from KiM to UZAS was in that period. If the propensity to move were negatively correlated with the local density of Serbs and Montenegrins, those Serbs remaining in other communities (in which they were not so much in the minority) would have had a lower rate of migration, at least if the pressures to migrate did not change. If those pressures did not exacerbate until after 1981, we would see what we do see in the patterns of migration rate. If we had similar migrational information after 1981 (say, in 1991), we might see an acceleration of the migration rate of Serbs from KiM to UZAS. This, too, would be commensurate with a scenario involving heterogeneity of susceptibility to threat.<sup>19</sup>

We may also test these ideas for Albanians in KiM and for both groups in the communities of UZAS bordering KiM. There are not many Albanians in most of those border communities, but the proportion of Serbs and Montenegrins in them was low in some because of the presence of large numbers of persons of other ethnic groups, principally those declaring themselves as Muslim.<sup>20</sup> Making the same test as before we find similar relationships. Thus, even within UZAS, the number of Serbs tended to diminish the most in those communities in which they were least represented to begin with. Similarly, Albanians in KiM and

UZAS lose the largest proportion where they were weakly represented and gain the largest where they were strongly represented. We must be careful in this argument, because the diminution in numbers may be the result of processes other than migration. To believe that migration was not responsible, we would have to believe that Serbs (or Montenegrins) had lower fertility or higher mortality in communities in which they were less numerous, or that non-Serbs (or non-Montenegrins) had higher fertility or lower mortality in places in which they were more numerous. These are not implausible scenarios, because the more numerous ethnic populations may have become so largely on account of differential fertility at least. The non-migrational and the migrational interpretations of these compositional changes are not, of course mutually exclusive. We just do not have the data to decide how much of the observed changes to attribute to which factor. Similarly, we must be wary of easy acceptance of psychological or cultural causation of migration that emphasizes ethnic conflict. It is not implausible to imagine that those communities in which Serbs were least represented were economically the least developed, and that Serb emigration from them was economically driven, no matter what stories were told later by those who emigrated. Economic explanation of this kind is more general than that dependent on the scenario of flight, if we consider the parallelism between KiM and UZAS, in which the least Serbian communities experienced the greatest proportional loss of Serbs. Without controls for economic factors at the microlevel, and without testimony from Serbs who did not leave KiM or the UZAS borderland, selection of causality is arbitrary, and the data cannot disconfirm several competing hypotheses.<sup>21</sup> Summing up, what is most remarkable is the similarities between Albanians and Serbs, both in KiM and UZAS. Each group, in each place, was (arguably) moving more out of areas in which they were weak. Each group, in its own home territory, made some gains in population (and of course Serbs made gains in UZAS outside the border zone). Thus it is a plausible conjecture that each group in each area was moving from places of weak representation to places of strong representation, in a process of increasing separation of ethnic groups on the ground. This is not a story just of Serbs fleeing Albanians but of everyone putting the wagons in a circle.

## Conclusions

In this paper we have used published data on internal migration within and between Inner Serbia and Kosovo by Serbs and Albanians to reconstruct migrational flows. Analysis by Petrovic and Blagojevic of broad population counts and of survey information from displaced Serbs in UZAS yielded conclusions incommensurate with our results. We propose that the migrational situation is more complex than that previously outlined, and that more sophisticated treatment of the data is essential. We take some steps in that direction here: We reconstruct the original migrant cohorts by surviving those reported in the census, and correcting for subsequent migration. We adjust for the size of populations at risk of migrating, and we focus on the migration rate by taking account of exposure to risk. We attempt to accommodate Petrovic and Blagojevic's conclusions by introducing the notion of heterogeneity of the propensity or pressure to migrate. Under conditions of appropriate heterogeneity, for which we find indirect ancillary support in other census data, their conclusions cannot be so easily rejected. Nothing in our analysis denies the veracity of their reportage; it is clear that there was ethnic unrest and clear that emigrants expressed victimization. The question is not the veracity of responses in the survey materials but their representativeness and the exhaustiveness of the explanations. Can they account for the patterns in the data? We propose that they cannot entirely do so without more sophisticated treatment, as we have outlined.

We recognize that our own analysis, although as refined as we can make it with the data currently available, falls far short of a full technical account, for which more detailed information would be necessary. In a full accounting, we would use ethnospecific information by small region or community, including birth and death rates and population counts to estimate net migration, then compare these results to the reported migrational flows in Table 056. Ideally, we would have such information for 1991 as well as 1981, so as to capture the period when ethnic tensions were perhaps rising most rapidly. Such data are not available in the published sources and would have to be recovered from archival materials of the Serbian government. We propose that the shifting population balances, especially in KiM, cannot be understood without detailed examination of differential fertility and mortality, between ethnic groups, and over time. We conjecture that these factors may also be fundamental forces affecting ethnic population ratios after 1975, when migration risks actually slacken or decrease.

We also propose that the story of ethnic migration within and between UZAS and KiM must include elements of differential economic development and urbanization, preferably by economic sector, in the two regions and even at the community level. We note especially the broad similarities of changing migration rates in both ethnic groups over time, despite differences in the level of rate of migration; such commonalities are best explained by broad economic factors. Especially in regard to changes after 1975, as ethnic tensions began to exacerbate, we note the slackening propensity to move by all parties to the majority or the minority area (except Albanians into UZAS, whose rate of migration increases). It is difficult to imagine that Serbs would have decreased their propensity to move from KiM to UZAS, as our data show they did, on account of *rising* ethnic tensions in the former, nor would Albanians have increased their propensity to move from KiM to UZAS, unless these moves were made to ethnic enclaves not apparent to us in the census data.

We stress an important competing explanation for the slackening of migrational risk after 1975, namely a selection effect. If individuals or families, let us say Serbs in KiM were heterogeneous in their propensity to migrate, perhaps because they differed in the degree to which they could co-exist with their Albanian neighbors, then as migration proceeded over time, those remaining would be more resistant to migration, and the estimated risk would decrease, unless pressures to migrate increased. Such an increase in pressure may well have occurred from about 1985 onward, but our data based on the 1981 census cannot capture it. The limited ancillary information we have on ethnic distribution at the community level in KiM 1961-81 does suggest that Serb emigration out of KiM was probably most vigorous out of those communities in which they were least represented numerically and thus plausibly under the greatest pressure, although we cannot completely discount the effects of differential fertility and of economic development. This conjecture is supported by similar patterns in the UZAS borderland, where ethnic groups other than Serbs, Montenegrins, and Albanians were importantly represented, and where Serb-Albanian tensions could not have been as important as in KiM.

The events in KiM are among the most difficult and tragic experienced in the broad region after World War II. They are the extension of a long and antipathetic history. The conflict and its demographic causes and consequences deserve, indeed demand, explanation. Here we challenge the previous explanations (and our own) as incomplete and invite further analysis, if the data eventually allow.

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#### NOTES

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<sup>2</sup> Our use of the reporting language, Serbian, leads to use of "Kosovo" rather than the Albanophone form, "Kosova". We use KiM rather than the Communist acronym, Kosmet, which is found in earlier official sources of the post-1945 Yugoslavia. After 1974 the official name for the region was simply "Kosovo", adopted because "Metohija" had too

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Serbian a ring for the ethnically conscious Albanian majority population. (“Metohija” is from the Byzantine Greek μετοχια, “(a place of) monastery estates” and thus has the flavor of the mediaeval Serbian empire.) The word used for the Albanian ethnic category has also changed over time. Originally, *Šiptar*, the Serbo-Croatian rendering of the Albanian word for themselves, *Sqiptar*, was employed. (*Sqiptar* means one who speaks *sqip*, or Albanian). Since *Šiptar* came under a tabu of indecency, *Albanac* came into official use. Some earlier sources use *Arnaut*, from Turkish *arnavut* (Albanian). We have treated all these as synonyms. Readers who prefer one name for a region or ethnic group to another may substitute at will. We note the bitter pun in the acronym, UZAS, for Inner Serbia; the word, *uzas*, means “horror” in Serbian.

<sup>3</sup> We refresh the reader’s memory on some salient historical points. Virtually every one of these will be disputed by someone, depending on their political orientation. Fuller treatment, from a Serbian nationalist point of view, is given in Batakovic’s Ch. 2 of Petrovic and Blagojevic (1992), and from a distinctly anti-Serbian point of view (and indeed one often sympathetic to the Ottomans), by Malcolm (Malcolm 1998). A quick view of the spectrum of opinion can be had by searching for “kosovo” on the world wide web, where the origin myths and symbolic justifications of Serbs, Albanians, Turks, and others are presented with considerable artistic skill.

Albanian is an Indo-European language as yet unrelated by historical linguists reliably to any others (except as Indo-European), with strong lexical influence from Latin and Italian. Speakers of Albanian may have preceded the Slavic ancestors of the Serbs to the Balkans and may have formed part of the romanized Illyrian population later called “Vlachs”, a population that in later times was variously constituted of Romanian-, Slavic-, and Greek-speaking pastoralists, in locales from Romania to Istria to Epirus. (The “identity” of the Vlachs is a contentious topic in the Balkans. The word “Vlach” is derived from a Germanic root, *\*woloach*, which was applied by the advancing germanic tribesmen to the Romanized Celts they encountered. From these derive words like Wales, Cornwall, Walloon, Wallachia, Wallace, etc. The definition of “Vlach” in mediaeval Serbian is given by the principal authority, Danicic, as “*romanus, covek koji se bavi stocarstvom*”, “A Roman, (i.e. a speaker of vulgar Latin), (or) a man who is engaged in stock-raising”. Thus it meant either inhabitants of the latinized coastal towns on the Adriatic or pastoralists, some of whom might be speakers of a Romance language. By the 14<sup>th</sup> century Albanian tribes and Slavic populations, including Montenegrin tribes and those within the dominant Serbian empire, along with the Bosnian kingdom, Bulgars and others, probably coexisted in the southern Balkans. It has been claimed (Urosevic 1987) that Kosovo contained no Albanians until the end of the 17<sup>th</sup> century. However, the Chrysobull of the monastery of Decani (c. 1331) contains one village identified as Albanian (Hammel 1980), and it is not entirely clear that some identified as “Vlachs” may not have been albanophone. Batakovic (op. cit.) acknowledges their early mediaeval presence, although in no great numbers, as does Malcolm (op. cit.). In 1389 all of these populations were overwhelmed by the Ottomans at the battle of Kosovo as part of a series of continuing conflicts that ended with the complete subjugation of the remnants of the Serbian mediaeval empire, along with Bosnia, and Albania in 1459 with the fall of Smederevo. It is worth noting that both Serbs and Albanians fought both for and against the Ottomans before, at, and after the battle of Kosovo. The history of the region even into the 20<sup>th</sup> century is one of clan, tribal and similar local conflicts, and ephemeral alliances between chieftans and surrounding imperial powers – Ottoman, Habsburg, Venetian, Russian, Italian, French, British, and most recently the United States and NATO. The political dynamics and callous treachery exhibited have an uncanny resemblance to the history of Scotland or Ireland and are equally obscured by self-serving myths and romantic symbolism.

Before 1389 most Slavs of the region (like the Greeks) were Orthodox; some Albanians were Orthodox (principally Toscs in Epirus) but most were Catholic (and for those reasons might not have been listed in the documents of Serbian Orthodox monasteries, which constitute the primary historical sources for KiM in the period). Most Albanians eventually converted to Islam, some remained Catholic; few remained Orthodox, although some Gheg clans in the Shkodra (Skadar, Scutari) region reputedly were slavized and became Montenegrin and Orthodox. The immigration of Muslim Albanians was facilitated by the Ottomans, especially after the northward flight of about 30,000 Serbs in 1689-90 following the collapse of an Austrian offensive and a failed Serb uprising, and a similar exodus in 1737, following brutal Ottoman repression. Separatist tendencies emerged among local Ottoman officials as the Empire began to collapse in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century and the Habsburgs began an inexorable pressure to reach the Aegean. Independent clan chiefs in the Albanian and Montenegrin highlands, however, often supported the Sultan to defend themselves against the modernizing reforms of the Young Turks. In the first Balkan war, 1911, Serbs, Montenegrins and Albanians all rebelled against the Ottomans, and Serbia and Montenegro, fighting against mainly Albanian troops under Ottoman command, occupied Kosovo and much of what is now northern Albania. The Serbs and Montenegrins were denied most of their Albanian conquest by the actions of the major European powers in 1912 at the behest of Austria and Italy, who combined to block Russian influence in the Balkans, in continuation of customary Habsburg strategy. That strategy also included thwarting Serbian access to the Adriatic and a hegemony that might block eventual Austrian access to the Mediterranean. It was this conflict combined with the terrorism of some Serb nationalists that led to World War I. During World War I, Serbia and Montenegro were on the side of the Allies; Albania was technically neutral but it and most Kosovo Albanians were sympathetic to Austria-Hungary, which favored an independent Albania in order to thwart Serbian expansion. In that war, Serbs retreating to Corfu through the Albanian mountains they had

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conquered in the Balkan Wars were (by pro-Serbian accounts) attacked by Albanian tribal guerillas, or by pro-Albanian accounts simply not assisted by them and left to starve and freeze. These events further exacerbated interethnic relations that had begun to deteriorate seriously as Ottoman control collapsed. In the peace negotiations after World War I, Italy, having joined the Allies, was able to block Serbian and Montenegrin claims to Albanian territory, but not to Kosovo and Metohija, which became part of the first Yugoslavia. In World War II the Serbs and Montenegrins were again allied against the Germans and Italians, the Albanians with the latter. In 1943 Italy and Germany created a Greater Albania that included Albania, Kosovo, and Western Macedonia, leaving Eastern Macedonia to their Bulgarian allies. In 1945 the older boundaries were restored under the victorious anti-Axis Communist government of Yugoslavia. Serbs who had previously resided in Kosovo were by some accounts not permitted to return, and by other accounts permitted after some delay, but the settlement of new Serb settlers was allowed. The largely Serb-controlled police were abusive of the Albanian population, especially of Albanian ethnic nationalism, and Albanian militancy began to rise, directed now against the Serbs rather than the Ottomans. In general, Albanians were a despised minority throughout Inner Serbia. In 1974 Kosovo and its largely Albanian population were granted special constitutional autonomies in the Party's efforts both to calm ethnic tensions and also to cripple Serbian nationalist threats to the Communist state. (It should be remembered that royalist Serbs, or so-called Chetniks, under Mihajlovic, fought against the Communist Partisans and sometimes collaborated with the Axis against them during World War II.) These threats to Party control became particularly apparent during the ascendancy of the nationalist Serb, Rankovic, in the early 1960's as head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (internal security police). Despite efforts to mollify the Albanian population, ethnic conflict increased. In 1968 large-scale Albanian demonstrations broke out with the demand by ethnic Albanian organizations to upgrade the status of Kosovo from autonomous province within Serbia to a republic in the Yugoslav federation. The combination of social and ethnic grievances led to a nationalist explosion in 1981. Repressive policies of the Yugoslav regime followed, but they did not stop the continuing exodus of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo. Tension reached a pitch in 1989, when the then President of (the remnant) Yugoslavia, S. Milošević, declared Serbian resistance in a speech in Kosovo on the anniversary of the battle of 1389, and Yugoslavia then revoked the constitutional changes of 1974 and thus the cultural autonomy of the Albanian population. Militancy increased even more, leading to the open warfare and NATO intrusion of 1999. Petrovic's analysis, researched in 1985, appeared in 1989 and was part of a series of statements from the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, supporting the Serbian nationalist position (but not necessarily the Milošević position) in a collapsing Yugoslavia. See Blagojevic (Blagojevic 1998). Interested readers are urged to read, among other sources, both Batakovic (op. cit.) and Malcolm (op. cit). Malcolm goes to particular pains to demolish Serbian claims to KiM as a "holy site", reconstructing the associations of Serbia with KiM as a deliberate scheme of romanticist 19<sup>th</sup> century ethnographers and historians. There is much to say for his argument, but he does not parallel it with similar commentary on Albanian romanticism.

<sup>4</sup> We do have information for several points in time, on the birth and death rates in UZAS and KiM and also on the proportion of inhabitants in each ethnic group. In principle we could estimate by regression the effect of varying ethnicity on birth and death rates and thereby estimate the difference between the birth and death rates of different ethnic groups. However, nothing in this estimation would obviate the (strong) possibility that such changes over time were driven by some unknown tertium quid, such as industrialization. Indeed, as the proportion of Albanians in Kosovo went from about 0.68 in 1948 to 0.65 in 1953 and then 0.77 in 1985, the CBR in KiM declined from 46 to 31. Yet we know ethnographically that the Albanian CBR is higher than the Serbian. Cross-sectional comparison between KiM and UZAS shows that fertility in the former is higher, that fertility in both is declining but more rapidly in the latter. But of course economic conditions are vastly different in the two regions. We would be on firmer ground if we had microlevel data for counties or townships over time, but as yet we do not. The ideal solution would be to have ethnospecific rates, but we think it unlikely that these could be obtained without reprocessing the raw data of the series of Yugoslav censuses. That some such data exist is suggested in Petrovic and Blagojevic (1989: Table 2.5, p. 87; 1992: Table 4, p. 80), giving information on the "natural increment" for Serbs and Albanians, based on numbers of births by ethnicity of mother, and numbers of deaths by nationality, within KiM.

<sup>5</sup> By contrast with the U.S. census, those of Yugoslavia report data consistently in terms of civil-political units rather than census units (SMSAs, tracts, blocks, etc.). The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was divided into 6 *republike* (republics, analogous to U.S. "states" and now the successor states of the SFRY): Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia). Each of these was divided into some number of *srezovi* (sing. *srez*, roughly "counties"), these into some number of *opštine* (sing. *opština*), which could be loosely glossed as "community, town, township, borough, ward", and within these into *naselja* (sing. *naselje*), "settlement, locality, neighborhood". Thus, an *opština* in a rural area can consist of a small town or a cluster of villages, but a section of a city elsewhere. We use the English gloss, "community" for *opština*. Serbia contained two "autonomous provinces", Vojvodina and KiM, as well as the core area, called Uza Srbija (Inner Serbia). The censuses in 1961 and later employ a classification of settlements that depends both on size and on the proportion of the population that is non-agricultural. "Villages" can be as large as 14,999 persons if they have less than 10 percent of their population outside agriculture, or as small as less than 200 if they have less than 10 percent in agriculture. The names of settlements have changed over time, but the number of settlements has been reasonably stable. The boundaries of units below the republic level have changed, often substantially, making cross-temporal comparison sometimes difficult at lower levels (above *locality*). Such boundary changes affected even the definitions at the "republic" level in the first Yugoslavia before World War II, as part of an

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explicit effort to erase previous national identities. In 1971 and later, KiM was not divided into *counties* but only directly into *communities*.

<sup>6</sup> This “table” is enormous, over 600 pages, constituting an entire volume of the census. It gives data in the format noted, for all of Yugoslavia, for each republic, for UZAS, and for each of the autonomous provinces (SAP) of KiM and Voyvodina. Similar data are available in Vol. 12 of the census of 1961, down to the *locality* level, and including classification of *localities* by type (villages, etc. – see note above). However, the 1961 census does not classify these data by ethnicity.

<sup>7</sup> The independence and role of local, often albanophone, statistical agencies in KiM are unknown to us but according to Serbian analysts may have affected data collection. We assume here that reporting errors (which surely occur) were at least not intentionally biased. However, some Serbian statisticians are of the view that event counts in Albanian communities may be understated as part of a syndrome of distrust of central authority. They suggest that underreporting or at least delayed reporting is most severe for deaths, since deaths might reduce welfare benefits to households.

<sup>8</sup> Montenegrin, Croatian, Macedonian, Muslim, Slovenian, Serbian, Albanian, Austrian, Bulgarian, Czech, Greek, Italian, Jewish, Hungarian, German, Polish, Rom (“Gypsy”), Romanian, Russian, Ruthenian, Slovak, Turkish, Ukranian, Vlach, Yugoslav.

<sup>9</sup> Petrovic and Blagojevic (*op. cit.*) consider Serbs and Montenegrins together in contrast to Albanians. This makes good sense in terms of ethnic classification, but it would make most of our analysis impossibly difficult. We can fairly easily discuss the movement of two groups within and between two regions, but to include Montenegrins with Serbs would require us to deal at the least with the movement of two groups within and between three regions and would double the size of the presentation. While it makes sense to combine Serbs and Montenegrins, it does not make sense (and with no political view here intended) to combine Serbia and Montenegro.

<sup>10</sup> We could of course use model life tables, but it is not clear, in the absence of ethnospecific information for each region, how we would pick them. If we had enough ethnospecific information to pick them, we would not need them.

<sup>11</sup> We stress again that the analysis would be more precise if we knew the ethnospecific survival rates within each region. We also note that our interpolations of the CDR during World War II, based on prewar and 1948 data, may be mis-estimated, and that any delayed or underreporting of deaths in KiM may result in mis-estimation of survival rates there.

<sup>12</sup> Obviously, they need not show larger arithmetic differences in the more distant past, since fewer persons may have migrated then.

<sup>13</sup> The basic data for the denominators are derived from the censal reports of population by ethnicity in UZAS and KiM, smoothed intercensally to give the estimated populations at the midpoints of the migration periods. We make one “correction” in the basic census reports. In 1953 and 1961 the reports of persons of “Turkish” ethnicity in KiM appear grossly inflated. The counts for 1948, 1953, 1961, and 1971 are respectively, 1315, 34583, 25784, and 12244. We estimated the annual growth rate for Turks using the data for 1948 and 1971 only, then estimated the counts for 1953 and 1961 on that basis. The “excess” of Turks in 1953 and 1961 was added to the Albanian total. Petrovic and Blagojevic also note the inflation of the Turkish count and attribute it to Albanians’ declaring themselves as Turks to improve their chances of emigrating to Turkey (1989: 85; 1992: 79). Malcolm (1998:322) also discusses this point and claims that the “ethnic cleansing” of KiM was encouraged by Serb elements in the Party. We should note, as Malcolm does not, that “ethnic cleansing” by the exchange of populations or simply by deportation was a common and internationally approved solution to the ethnic heterogeneity of former Ottoman territories after the Balkan Wars, especially in the exchange of Greek and Turkish populations.

<sup>14</sup> Demographers will recognize the three steps as the  $d_x$ ,  $q_x$ , and  $m_x$  of the life table.

<sup>15</sup> No political position is intended by this simple classification.

<sup>16</sup> The low migration rates for the war period almost surely do not reflect actual population movements in that period, when large segments of the population were in flux, many of them returning to their home localities after the war. Those who remained would not have reported that they had migrated there during the war; some may have reported that they had migrated there after the war.

<sup>17</sup> The denominator for these proportions includes only Serbs, Montenegrins, Muslims, and Albanians. The reporting for some other groups is unstable, or they are only weakly represented. The Albanian-Turkish crossover in ethnic reporting seems to have ceased by 1971. The proportion of “Yugoslavs” is modest in KiM and the border counties of SW Serbia, but it does fluctuate unreliably. The number of Romi (“Gypsies”) is quite unreliably reported. Our comparisons do not include earlier censuses, such as 1961, because boundary changes as the county and community level make comparisons difficult.

<sup>18</sup> In these calculations, since the log of zero is undefined, the few zero values were given a minute positive value (epsilon).

<sup>19</sup> Petrovic and Blagojevic do observe that most of their respondents, emigrants out of Kosovo, had come from communities in which Serbs were weakly represented (Petrovic and Blagojevic 1989: 88-94; 1992: 82-85), but they do not relate this to any possible diminution in the propensity to migrate on account of a selection effect. If they had had a control group of non-migrants who remained in Kosovo, that might have been directly observable. However, they note in discussion of their sample that field conditions were not conducive to conducting interviews within Kosovo itself in

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1985-86, and no control group was deemed possible. It was apparently similarly impossible to have a control group of Albanians either in Kosovo or in Serbia, and this lack makes it difficult to test the importance of purely economic factors, factors which Petrovic and Blagojevic are led to dismiss as unimportant in influencing migration.

<sup>20</sup> In some communities, for example in the Sandjak to the north of Kosovo, many Muslims are Muslim Slavs, as in Bosnia-Hercegovina. The opština of Tutin is a good example. In others, some persons reporting as Muslims may have been Albanian.

<sup>21</sup> While we have not done a broad set of wider comparisons, it is worth noting that these patterns do not seem to hold for Muslims in UZAS or for Serbs or Albanians in UZAS outside of the border region. This observation strengthens the idea that specifically Albanian-Serbian ethnic conflict may have played a role. It does not support the intriguing hypothesis that what in Serbian is called the “nationalization”, i.e. the “ethnicization”, of politics at the Federal level in Yugoslavia, and in the structure of the Communist Party, was part of a much broader, deeper ethhnicization that operated at all levels of the society. On the other hand, we may see just the tip of the iceberg in the acute Serb-Albanian conflict, and documentation of the process elsewhere may just be harder.